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Abstract. Functional safety is an important component of safety in general, has received increasing attention in the 
petroleum and chemical industry, railway and other industries which used a complicated process, in case of failure 
can cause major damage and loss of life. Electric engineering is also among these industries. But quantitative analysis 
shows that the equipment of power plants does not satisfy stringent requirements of functional safety. 
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I  INTRODUCTION 
In the history of electric power can distinguish the 
individual stages of development, related to specific 
scientific and technological advances (the invention of 
the generator, the creation of a three-phase systems, 
nuclear energy, etc.). It is now one of the most actual 
areas of the industry is the introduction of power 
plants and substations digital multifunction systems 
automation technologies that could improve the 
efficiency of the plants and networks. But the 
application of such systems is possible only under 
strict safety requirements. It is considered from the 
standpoint of security the focus of this review of 
modern automation systems for the power industry. 
II  MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The concept of security is extremely extensive. For 
complex continuous process using more specialized 
concept of functional safety (FS). FS is a part of an 
overall security, expressed in the absence of 
unacceptable risk to human health, their property, the 
environment from the functioning of the system. FS is 
provided by the so-called safety-related systems - 
systems that perform one or more specialized 
functions, to prevent the onset of dangerous failures. 
A dangerous failure meant crossing the equipment 
inoperable by an unpredictable or undesirable 
scenario. At power security systems are primarily 
technological protection. 
Safety-related systems are interconnected by 
communication channels sensors that take readings of 
critical parameters, controllers that analyze the 
parameters and give commands, final elements  that 
implement the controller’s commands. 
Initially, when the security-related systems were 
built on electromechanical relays, hardware protection 
functions were not associated with the functions of 
control. At present due to the development of 
automation systems safety functions are increasingly 
being integrated into a single framework automation, 
which, along with the safety function also performs: 
- process control - local (actions performed by 
the controller without a command from the 
outside) and remote (commands come from the 
remote supervisory control); 
- measurement - the collection and processing of 
sensor readings in real time; 
- monitoring - recording of emergency processes 
and analysis of the current state; 
- communication - the transfer of information 
between the field level and supervisory system, 
between the protection and monitoring for 
subsequent evaluation of emergency events. 
The safety functionin spite of the integration at the 
hardware and software levels, continues to be an 
isolateds, locals, because of its independent actions 
depend lives and health of personnel, damage to 
equipment during the failure. Other automatic 
functions should not affect the effectiveness of safety 
functions. 
There are few tens of technological protections in 
thermal power plants (a specific amount depends on 
the schema and power  of thermotechnical 
equipment). Traditionally, protections are divided into 
two groups - that trigger when exist danger for life of 
personnel and safety of equipment (group A) and 
trigger when exist danger for equipment damage or a 
reduction in its resource (group B). Below, for 
example, here is a list of boiler and turbine units 
protections group A  for a drum boiler: 
- extinction of the flame in the firebox; 
- lowering the gas pressure after regulating 
valve; 
- disable all smoke exhausts; 
- disable all blasting ventilators; 
- lowering the pressure in the lubrication system; 
- increasing vibration bearing housings; 
- lowering of the level in the damper oil tank; 
- increase the pressure drop in the last stage 
pressure turbine; 
- increasing the level of high pressure heater to 
the 2nd limit. 
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As described above, any power TK as a security 
system is analog and digital sensor data, 
thermocouples, thermistors, followed by 
communication with the input device (CPI) providing 
a normalization signal preprocessing, the conversion 
of analog to digital values and their transfer to the 
controller. Modern programmable controllers perform 
many functions, logic operations, signal processing, 
control actuators, control, execution of commands 
from the user, etc. The controller provides signals to 
the final elements . The final elements of safety-
related system on the block power plants with a drum 
boiler include: 
 fuel supply device; 
 ignition device; 
 shut-off devices; 
 valves; 
 regulators; 
 electric pumps. 
General scheme of the security channel is shown on 
Fig. 1. 
Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of the channel security system 
To ensure safe and reliable safety-related systems 
use different architecture of this scheme, characterized 
by the redundancy. General architectures redundancy 
symbol is MooN, an M out of N. N - total number of 
redundant elements, M - the number of elements 
required to maintain the system in good working 
condition. Reserve are primarily controllers as the 
most critical elements of the systems that perform 
several functions, sensors to provide a system of 
reliable data, much less reserve final elements. 
According to the standard 61508 MooN concept 
applies to the channel - a full set of sensors, the 
controller and the final elements independently 
realizing safety function . Work if one of the channels 
is allowed only at the time of finding the cause and 
repair (18 hours). 
There are several types of architectures: 
 1oo1 - the simplest not redundant architecture. 
Single failure results in failure of the entire 
system. 
 1oo2 - «one out of two». To perform the 
function of protection is sufficient to obtain a 
command from a single channel. In the event of 
failure of one of the channels, the work carried 
out on single-channel scheme, in 1oo1. 
 2oo2 - «two out of two». Circuit performs an 
operation to protect only when a command is 
received in two channels. Failure of one of the 
channels leading to the inability to carry out a 
protective function. 
 2oo3 - «two out of three» or majoritarian 
scheme. Made the implementation of thesafety 
function when receiving commands from any 
two channels. The failure of two or three 
channels leads to unhealthy state of the system. 
In addition to these common architectures 
modifications MooND, which are distinguished by the 
presence of special diagnostic modules that increase 
the safety of the protection systems. 
In real technological protection schemes are often 
used combinations of architectures. Sensors are built 
on a "two out of three", controllers - "one of the two", 
and is located directly in the work of a single 
controller, and the second is in hot standby, and the 
only one final element (Figure 2). To assess the safety 
of the combined architecture needs to be assessed 
individually set of input sensors and communication 
devices, controllers, input and output remote terminal 
unit (RTU). 
 
Fig. 2. The combined safety architecture 
Such scheme is used in protection “increasing the 
level of high pressure heater to the 2nd limit”, for 
example.  Below is quantify assessment of functional 
safety for Fig. 2. 
The main quantitative assessment of functional 
safety is the probability of failure on demand (PFD). It 
is probability of failure of the safety function when 
function should be triggered. The refusal of a failure is 
called a dangerous failure. The intensity of a 
dangerous failure is indicated λD. In contrast, there is a 
false alarm of a failure, called the safe 
failure, indicated λS. Dangerous and safe failures are 
divided into detectable internal diagnostics (λDD and 
λSD) and undetectable (λDU и λSU). Failures are divided 
into individual failures and common cause failures 
when the failure is more than one channel. Share of 
common cause failures is small, but it must be taken 
into account in the safety assessment, as the 
consequences of such failures are greatest. The shares 
of common cause failures are indicated βD for detected 
and βU for undetected. 
Failure rate should be multiplied to their respective 
time intervals to find a probability. 
These time intervals are: 
 T – proof test interval; 
 t – the time of appearance of undetectable 
failure in the system; equals tCE –the average 
time a link failure; 
 MTTR – Mean Time To Recovery; 
     
 
 
      – time of undetectable 
dangerous failure; 
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          – time of dangerous detected 
failure; 
 tGE – average time of failure of all system. 
Intervals are presented graphically in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Graphical representation of appearance and detecting 
failures processes 
The time t is assumed to be T/2 is taken as a 
uniform distribution of failure over time. 
We define the rate for PFD sensor subsystem 
having architecture 2oo3. 
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The expression                        
in this formula is nothing else but the failure rate of a 
dangerous failure λD. Coefficient 6 is a result of taking 
into account the three channels and that the time T 
more time tCE twice. The values of the time intervals 
tCE and tGE determined by the expressions: 
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Time of dangerous undetectable failure of the entire 
system in the last formula is accepted T/3 +MTTR, 
because the appearance of two faults during the proof 
test interval are also uniform, that is occurring every 
third proof test interval. 
The probability of failure on demand for logic 
controller with architecture 1oo2 PFDL is given by: 
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Values  tCE and tGE for 1oo2 architecture are defined 
as well as for 2oo3. 
For the subsystem of final elements, which has 
architecture 1oo1, PFDFE is: 
                      (5) 
Failure of channel in this case is the failure of a 
subsystem itself and therefore takes into account only 
the time tCE. 
III  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
As an example, we take the controller 
TSXP572634M Shneider Electric. Its failure rate, as 
declared by the manufacturer is about 1.4 * 10
-6
 
1/hour. For convenience, it is assumed that λD=λS=λ/2. 
The ratio of λDD and λDU determined by the diagnostic 
coverage: 
   
    
   
 (6) 
Typically, DC takes 0%, 60%, 90%, 99%. For this 
calculation, we assume diagnostic coverage as 90%. 
Then    =0,9  =(0,9* λ)/2=0,63*10
-6
  1/hour. For 
undetected failures λDU=0,07*10
-6
 1/hour. 
Shares of detected and undetected common cause 
failures βD=1% and βU=2%.  
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As an final element of technological protection 
choose the main steam valve. It is known that its time 
between failures (MTBF) is approximately 5000 
hours, then the failure rate λ = 0,002 1/hr. The values 
of DC, βD, βU accept the same as for the controllers 
respectively time tCE will remain the same, λDD= 
0,0009 1/hour, λDU=0,0001 1/hour. 
                                  (11) 
Using the same values of DC, βD, βU for subsystems 
of sensors count the safety of architecture 2oo3. The 
sensors pick differential pressure gauges DM-3583M. 
The failure rate for these devices will take 0.35 * 10-6 
1/hour. Obtain that λ DD = 0,1575*10
-6
 1/hour, а λ DU = 
0,035*10
-6
 1/hour.  
                         
   
             10 6]2                     10
 6               10 6 87602+18=5,447 *10-6     
(12) 
Thus, the resulting safety indicator is the sum of the 
three components. 
                         (13) 
IV  CONCLUSION 
The probability of failure on demand of sensors and 
controllers are insignificant compared to the PFDFE. It 
turns out that  the final element is the weakest point in 
the consideration of technological protection. The 
resulting figure PFD does not meet modern safety 
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requirements for safety systems of complex processes 
(PFD= 0,001..0,0001). 
Technological protection usually gives commands 
to multiple final elements that perform different 
functions of safe shutdown of the process are not 
duplicating each other. Therefore, despite the active 
attention to digital automation equipment, a 
translation of all systems on the microcontroller to 
provide safety management will not be succeed. 
V  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This study was partly supported by JSC Pskov 
Power Plant. 
VI  REFERENCES 
[1] IEC 61508-4:2010 Functional safety of electrical/ 
electronic/programmable electronic safety related systems. 
Part 4: Definitions and abbreviations. 
[2] IEC 61508-6:2010 Functional safety of electrical/ 
electronic/programmable electronic safety related systems. 
Part 6: Guidelines on the application of IEC 61508-2 and IEC 
61508-3. 
[3] Fedorov Y. Handbook for ICS Engineer: Design and 
Development. Moscow: Infra-ingeneria, 2008. 
[4] Strauss C. Practical Electrical Network Automation and 
Communication Systems.  Milpitas, CA: IDC Technology, 
2004. 
 
 
 
